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Abstract 
Each search term put into a search engine produces a separate set of results. Correspondingly, 
each of the sets of ads displayed alongside the results is priced using a separate auction. We 
investigate how bids for these context-based ads depends on the difficulty of making a match. 
This contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the effect of match quality. We examine 
advertising prices paid by lawyers for 139 Google search terms in 195 locations. Other things 
being equal, the fewer searches there are on a term, the higher the price. To identify a causal 
relationship between match-difficulty and prices paid, we exploit a natural experiment in 
“ambulance-chaser” regulations across states. When lawyers cannot contact a client by mail and 
matching becomes more difficult, the relative price per ad click is $0.93 higher. We check the 
robustness of this result by performing a falsification test using a different ambulance-chaser 
regulation. Our results suggest that prices are higher for context-based ads when the difficulty of 
both online and off-line matching increases. This highlights that a major reason why search 
advertising is profitable is because its use of context can monetize the "long tail" by reducing 
friction in the matching process.  
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1. Introduction 
In 1998, Goto.com
1
 introduced two novel features to search advertising markets that had 
not been tried before in other advertising markets:  (1) The use of electronic auctions and (2) the 
ability to provide and price advertisements based on search terms or “keywords.” The practical 
implications of these new features were as follows.  A personal injury lawyer and an immigration 
lawyer decide to advertise their services. Using normal media channels, like newspapers, 
magazines, Yellow Pages or a banner ad on a website, they would pay the same price, given the 
advertisement’s physical size, placement and the audience size and demographics. However, if 
they used Google, which uses a similar system to Goto.com's, it would be a different story. The 
personal injury lawyer, after placing a bid online, would pay on average $26.18 every time 
someone clicked on her ad alongside a search for “personal injury lawyer”. However, the 
immigration lawyer using Google would have to pay on average only $7.48 per click for the 
same sized ad, displayed alongside a search for “immigration lawyer.”  
So far, the academic literature on search-engine ad pricing has focused on the question of 
how search auctions reflect the "match-value" of such ads, in terms of how much a firm values 
the match with the consumer. By contrast, in this paper we investigate how search auction prices 
reflect the "match-difficulty" of such ads; that is, how difficult it is for firms to reach customers 
through online and off-line methods. This allows us to explore the extent to which search engine 
advertising reaps the benefits of monetizing the "long tail" of advertising, where hard-to-match 
obscure clients and obscure products find each other.  
We first establish that there is a negative relationship between search volume and prices. 
Although our finding this relationship does suggest that when a match is difficult (i.e. few 
                                                 
1
Goto.com was renamed Overture in 2001 and purchased by Yahoo in 2003. Prior to this time, search engine ads 
were priced by impressions and demographics.  
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customers are searching for that service), search ad prices will be higher, it is not conclusive 
because search volume may be endogenous.  
To address this identification challenge, we look for exogenous variation in how difficult 
it is to make a match. We find such variation in state bar regulations that prohibit "ambulance-
chasing behavior" for the $40 billion sector of trial lawyers. Many states have laws that prevent 
lawyers contacting potential clients using written media for a few months after the accident. This 
makes it harder for vendors to match with clients.  We use data from market research conducted 
by a lawyer website portal. We have data on estimated auction prices for with 139 different 
searches for various legal service “keywords” in 195 regional city markets. We regress a 
keyword’s estimated price per click on fixed effects for each location and keyword, and an 
indicator variable for whether the keyword is affected by state regulations.  
We find that in locations with solicitation regulations, injury keywords cost advertisers an 
extra $1.01 (roughly 7%) relative to the price of other keywords (such as “tax lawyer”) in that 
state, compared with the price premium of personal injury keywords in non-regulated states. We 
perform a battery of tests to check the robustness of this result. These include a falsification test 
for the endogeneity of the state law, using an alternate law that is similarly motivated.  Overall, 
our results suggests that when advertisers cannot reach customers through alternative advertising 
platforms and matching is harder, ad prices rise. The search engine enables these difficult 
matches cheaply, so it can profit from the "long tail" of advertising. The relatively frictionless 
nature of context-based ad pricing means that the search engine, the advertisers, and the 
customers gain from advertiser-client matches that are otherwise problematic or costly using 
alternative on-line or off-line methods.  
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2. Related Literature 
We examine how much context-based ad pricing in media platforms depends on the 
difficulty of making a match. We build on four distinct literatures: (1) two-sided advertising 
markets, (2) online advertising, (3) online/offline substitution, and (4) legal services marketing. 
Previous research on two-sided media platforms like search engines has modeled the use 
of content to attract customers and consequently advertisers (Anderson and Gabszewicz 2005; 
Xie and Chen 2007). However, this literature promotes models where advertisers pay more the 
more eyeballs they reach, rather than where payments vary with match-difficulty.
2
 The empirical 
literature has echoed this focus. Wilbur (2007) shows that TV ad prices increase with audience 
size.  Busse and Rysman (2005) show that yellow pages ad prices increase with ad size and, by 
implication, exposure. By contrast, this paper emphasizes that prices can rise when advertisers 
expect less exposure, because there are few potential clients on the other side of  the market.    
Our empirical focus on "match-difficulty"  illuminates a nascent theoretical literature on 
the potential benefits of “targeting” advertising. Work by Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas 
(2005) demonstrates the theoretical advantages that such targeting has for firms, while Gal-Or 
and Gal-Or (2005) use the example of customized television advertising to show that better 
targeting of advertisements increases customer welfare. Chen and He (2006) have extended this 
targeting literature to paid search.   
 Our emphasis on horizontal differentiation in match-difficulty across keywords contrasts 
with most of the literature, which focuses on how prices in position auctions reflect "match-
quality" or expected match profitability. A major contribution of this literature has been to use 
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 The consequences of such inflexible pricing policies are set out by Baye and Morgan (2001). They show that when 
a media platform sets a fixed advertising fee, this fee will exceed the socially optimal level and many potential 
advertisers will opt out. 
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heterogeneity in match-quality to explain why firms pay more per click to be displayed first 
(Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007)). Other theoretical and empirical articles generalize 
the second-price auction to take account of match-quality (e.g. Ganchev, et al. 2007), and 
therefore take "match-difficulty" as exogenous. Associated research, such as (Wilbur and Zhu 
2007)'s work on click fraud, examines how match-quality affects search advertising decisions.  
The empirical literature on search advertising in marketing has also focused on the effects 
of match-quality for search advertising. For example, Rutz and Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and 
Yang (2007) have shown the effects of different keywords on performance and cross-selling 
opportunities. The rest of the empirical literature on online advertising has focused on banner ads 
and email marketing (such as Manchanda, et al. 2006; Chatterjee, Hoffman and Novak 2003; and 
Ansari and Mela 2003), perhaps because these predate keyword advertising.
3
  
We also add to a growing literature on the relationship between offline and online options 
and marketing outcomes (Jank and Kannan  (2006); Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2007)). We 
add to this literature, that studies decisions by consumers to go online, by showing that firms' 
decisions to go online to make a match are dependent on how hard it is offline to make a match.  
Finally, our work is related to an older but substantial marketing literature on legal 
services advertising (Smith and Meyer 1980, Kotler and Connor 1977, Darden, Darden and Kiser 
1981). This literature was inspired by the deregulation of legal services advertising in 1977 and 
examined the consequences from both firm and consumer perspectives of the introduction of 
advertising and marketing by lawyers. We follow in this tradition by studying the relationship 
between regulation and lawyer advertising prices.  
                                                 
3
 The first banner advertisement (for Zima alcoholic beverage) appeared on Wired Magazine’s Hotwired website in 
1994. While OpenText briefly experimented with something like search advertising in 1996, it was not successfully 
implemented until Goto.com applied it in 1998. Prior to the establishment of auctions as the way to price keywords, 
Yahoo charged a fixed rate for banner advertisements placed near popular keywords.  
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3. Data on Advertising Prices for Lawyer Services 
We use marketing research data collected by a platform that brings together clients and 
lawyers. These data were collected from Google's “Traffic Estimator Tool”, which provides 
potential advertisers with a guide to the auction prices they would expect to pay for different 
keywords in different locations. The traffic estimator provides (given enough data points) a range 
of prices that other advertisers have paid recently for an ad being in positions 1-3 in a certain city 
and the search volume associated with that price range.  Our data contain projections for 139 
keywords for 195 geographic areas defined by Google to closely resemble (consolidated) 
metropolitan statistical areas. In order to use our natural experiment of state-level restrictions, we 
exclude metropolitan statistical areas that cross state lines, like Burlington, VT – Plattsburg, NY 
and New Bedford, MA – Providence, RI. Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 
data used in the study. Appendix Table 2 provides a complete list of the keywords used. 
There are two major challenges to using this data: Interpreting price data from an auction 
mechanism, and missing data. We discuss each in turn. In using data from the Traffic Estimator 
Tool, we use the exact information advertisers use in setting their bid prices. Since 2002, Google 
and Yahoo have sold keywords using second-price sealed bid auctions instead of less stable first-
price auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2007). However, the form of second-price 
auction used obscures how bids translate to prices. An advertiser places a bid based on its 
maximum willingness to pay for an ad to appear next to a specific search term for a specific 
geographical location. Google then bills a sum lower than this maximum price whenever the ad 
is clicked. However, an advertiser is not necessarily paying the second price that was bid in that 
particular auction. Instead, keyword prices post-bidding are adjusted for the quality of the 
website buying the keyword, click-fraud, and the clicks–to-impression ratio, with no information 
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given to advertisers (or researchers) about the precise formulas used. In this paper, we use 
“estimated prices” data for Google that abstract from this ex-post quality adjustment.4   
The average price per click for the different keywords and different types of keywords 
varies greatly.  Table 1 presents some initial results showing the relationship between search 
volume and keyword price. In these regressions, we used fixed effects to control for inherent 
differences in propensity to pay across keywords and across locations. For example, the keyword 
fixed effects control for the fact that ad prices for searches for food poisoning attorneys are less 
than 3 percent of ad prices for searches for aviation attorneys, as the expected payout of an 
aviation accident lawsuit is higher. The dummy for location captures city-specific factors such as 
comfort with the internet, which may explain why areas such as Greenwood, MI have click 
prices that are on average one-third of those in Newark, NJ. Our initial results in column 1 show 
a strong negative relationship between the average price per click and the reported search 
volume. To check that this was not an artifact of the linear specification, we also used log values 
of the price per click. These showed that our results hold for both percentage changes and levels. 
 
Table 1: Variation of CPC with Search Volume 
 
Dependent Variable 
Price Per Click Logged Price Per 
Click 
Price per Click 
Missing CPC data coded 
as zero (Tobit) 
Search Volume -1.229*** -0.0975*** -8.909*** 
 (0.155) (0.0168) (0.188) 
Observations 12271 12264 26964 
R-squared 0.809 0.890 0.274
5
 
Fixed effects for each region and each keyword included 
                                                 
4
 Google accounts for two-thirds of the search market (October, 2007). 
5
 Pseudo R-Squared 
8 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We face a missing data challenge, in that Google reports the cost per click range when 
they have enough historical data.
6
 We ran further regressions to evaluate whether the missing 
data were systematically connected to the type of keyword or to the presence of the solicitation 
regulations we use later in the paper for identification. We found no statistically significant 
evidence that they were. This lack of systematic correlation and the work of Little (1992) 
suggests that missing data are not driving our results. In addition, we ran Tobit specifications 
including the missing data that allowed for censoring of keyword price at the bottom of the 
observed range. The results, reported in column 3 of Table 1, have the same sign but are of larger 
magnitude than those reported in column 1. This suggests that if anything the missing data bias 
our estimates downwards.  
Another challenge of using these price data is that Google gives a price range, but not an 
indication of the distribution of prices paid between these lower and upper cutoffs. We report 
results for the midpoint of this range. We have repeated all our specifications using both the 
upper and lower limits, and obtained qualitatively similar results.  
The results in Table 1 show that there is a negative correlation between how many clients 
are searching (our proxy for the ease of an off-line match) and the price of the keyword. Of 
course there is a difficulty in putting a causal interpretation on this negative correlation, despite 
the inclusion of fixed effects for search phrase and location. There may be unobserved factors for 
that location that both reduce search volume and increase the profitability of a client lead, for 
select keywords. For example, suppose  this could be a location where mountainous roads meant 
                                                 
6
 A similar data sparseness issue was addressed by Rutz (2007), who uses Bayesian methods to help estimate search 
word performance for hotel search advertising data. Unfortunately for our purposes, Google has not embraced this 
methodology. 
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that trucks and consequently truck accidents were rare, but that when they did happen they were 
very serious. To tackle this inherent identification challenge, we use a natural experiment. 
  
4. Variation in Restrictions on Lawyer Behavior 
Trial lawyers earned $40 billion in 2004, an amount that is over 50 percent higher than 
Microsoft or Intel and twice that of Coca-Cola (National Review 2004). The size of this market 
makes studying advertising strategies in this industry independently important. However, for our 
purposes of identifying how the difficulty of off-line matches affects search advertising prices 
there are two other attractive features of this industry: Differences in state-level bar exams and 
the small-scale nature of personal-injury lawyer practices keep markets local
7
 and there is 
variation in rules regarding off-line solicitation across states. We use this variation in ambulance-
chasing solicitation regulations to establish whether context-based ad pricing is more profitable 
when off-line matching is more difficult. Each regulation gives us a natural experiment with a 
treatment group of locations affected by the regulation and a control group of locations that are 
not affected. To control for systematic differences between regulated and unregulated states, we 
contrast keyword prices affected by regulation with keyword prices that are unaffected by the 
state regulations in regulated states. Therefore, we estimate how much affected keywords diverge 
in price from unaffected keywords in regulated locations relative to unregulated locations.  
Law firms have only been allowed to advertise nationwide since 1977, when the Supreme 
Court ruled to allow legal advertising in Bates v. the State Bar of Arizona. This case brought to 
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 Though several states have reciprocity agreements with lawyers in other states, the small scale nature of most 
personal injury claims means that cases are tried locally by local lawyers.  
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an end a state bar association tradition that it was not seemly for lawyers to advertise their 
services in newspapers, on television, or through other channels. This deregulation prompted a 
spate of empirical evaluation by marketing scholars (Smith and Meyer 1980, Kotler and Connor 
1977, Darden, Darden and Kiser 1981) on legal service advertising. However, the notion that 
there are some types of marketing communications that demean the status of the law persists in 
local state bar regulations. In particular, some state bars prohibit lawyers from writing to 
potential clients who have recently sustained an accident or injury.  
A typical text in a state bar manual is found in a section entitled “solicitation”, and reads: 
“A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on a lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm 
or on behalf of a partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a 
written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if the 
written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of, or otherwise 
related to, an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of 
that person, unless the accident or disaster giving rise to the cause of action occurred more than X days before 
the mailing of the communication” 
Table 2 records all regulations as of April 2007 where a state bar forbade written communication 
to potential clients. There is a little variation over how long the states prohibited contact (the 
mode is 30 days), but the regulations are similar. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between the enacting of a law and the number of lawyers per dollar of gross state 
product, the number of civil suits per head, state population, or state GDP (Appendix Table 3). 
Table 2: Bar regulations prohibiting contact with clients 
State Personal injury laws/rules 
Alabama No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Arizona No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Arkansas No written communication allowed 30 days for wrongful death 
Colorado No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or death 
Connecticut No written communication allowed 40 days for personal injury or death 
Florida No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Georgia No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Hawaii No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
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Louisiana No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Missouri No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death (accident or disaster) 
Nevada Must wait 45 days after any known event before written communication 
New York No written communication for 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death unless law says need to file 
in 30 days in which case cannot solicit for 15 days 
South Carolina No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Tennessee No written communication allowed 30 days for workers’ comp, personal injury, or wrongful death 
Wyoming For written communications, need to wait 30 days after "occurrence" before soliciting a specific client 
 
Personal injury keywords can be objectively identified because bar associations uses a 
precise legal definition to define what is a personal injury case and what is not. Personal injury is 
damage to an individual rather than property, and is taken to cover accidents, medical 
negligence, and industrial diseases contracted by workers at their workplace. The personal injury 
keywords we identified cover regular accidents as well as industrial diseases such as 
mesothelioma where regulations apply after diagnosis or death.
8
 There are, however, a few cases 
where there may be both personal injury and injury to property in a civil suit. For example “toxic 
mold attorneys” may litigate for both personal injury damages and property damages. We tried 
including and excluding these “combined” civil cases, and achieved qualitatively similar results.  
5. Estimation Strategy and Results 
Using data on the prices of keywords across cities, we examine the responsiveness of 
keyword prices to this variation in how easy it is to make a match "off-line".  Descriptive 
statistics of keyword prices across regulatory regimes suggest that the regulations have an effect: 
keyword prices are 28 cents higher in states with solicitation regulation. These differences may, 
however, be a result of unobservable differences in willingness to pay across keywords and 
locations. To control for these unobservable differences, we include a series of fixed effects (i.e. 
                                                 
8
  The keywords, and whether they were categorized as personal injury keywords, are listed in Appendix Table 2. 
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dummy variables) for each location l and each keyword k and focus on the interaction between 
whether a keyword relates to personal injury and whether there is personal injury regulation in 
that state. The location fixed effects allow us to control for all city-level differences in numbers 
of lawyers, wealth, and litigiousness. The keyword fixed effects allow us to control for all 
keyword-level differences. Therefore, this empirical strategy allows us to control for differences 
in prices that occur because personal injury keywords are different from other keywords, and 
also differences in prices that occur because states that enact personal injury regulation are 
different from states that do not; this is known as a “differences in differences” approach.9 
Usually in differences-in-differences researchers take the approach of using a prior time periods 
not affected by the policy to control for geographical cross-sectional variation in customer 
behavior. By contrast, in this paper in place of a time series we use other keywords to control for 
this cross-sectional variation in consumer behavior. As long as there is no other systematic 
reason why personal injury keywords should be differently priced to non-personal injury 
keywords in states with regulation, we can interpret the interactions  as measuring the causal 
effect of the regulations on prices.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑘𝑙
=   𝛽 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑘 𝑋  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑙 
+ Keyword𝑘 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑙 + 𝜀𝑘𝑙  
          [1] 
We estimate equation [1] using a variety of distributional and specification assumptions. 
Table 3 displays results for our main specification. The estimates for the interactions suggest that 
                                                 
9
 This use of differences in differences is a similar idea to the specifications used by Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) 
in their study of online book reviews and Busse, Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) in their study of pass-through of auto 
manufacturer promotions. 
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both solicitation regulations and contingency fee limits affect the prices that lawyers pay for 
personal injury search terms. 
Table 3: Main Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Personal injury keyword and Law  1.013** 1.419** 0.866* 
restricting solicitation 
 
(0.496) (0.573) (0.447) 
Observations 12271 5067 12271 
R-squared 0.808 0.762 0.808 
 
Sample All Accident 
Words and 
Non-Specific 
Words 
Broader 
Definition of 
Accident Word 
    
All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each city and each keyword. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The presence of a solicitation regulation is associated with a $1.01 increase in the price 
for a personal injury keyword. These values are economically important relative to average 
keyword prices of $9.28. The significance of these estimates is robust to various specifications of 
the error structure. These results suggest that when state bar regulation makes it harder to contact 
personal injury victims by other marketing communications channels, lawyers are willing to pay 
relatively more for personal injury search advertising keywords.  
We conducted a number of robustness checks on our results. For the independent 
variables, we wanted to verify that it was not an idiosyncratic definition of “personal injury 
keyword” that led to our results. To allow for a broader definition of personal injury, we also 
tried a definition including “any violation of an individual's right, other than his or her rights in 
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property.” This added the keywords associated with “dog bites”, “mold”, “toxic mold”, 
“premises liability”, “food poisoning” and “nursing home abuse” to the treatment group. The 
results reported in column 3 of Table 3 are similar to before, if slightly less precise. We also ran 
a more limited regression that used only the non-specialty keywords in Appendix Table 2 as 
controls. The results reported in column 2 of Table 3 are very similar to the main results. 
 
6. A Falsification Check for the Endogeneity of the State Law 
The interpretation of our results relies on the assumption that the enacting of bar 
regulation over personal injury lawsuits is exogenous. One concern is, however, that these laws 
might reflect particular market conditions for lawyers. For example, solicitation regulation might 
be more likely in areas where lawyers are more aggressive at seeking clients.  However, these 
aggressive lawyers could also be more likely to win cases and consequently value a match more 
highly, driving up bid prices and confounding our results. 
As an initial check, we studied the correlation between the enactment of a law and state 
characteristics. We found no statistically significant relationship between solicitation restrictions 
and the number of lawyers per dollar gross state product, the number of civil suits per capita, the 
state’s population, or gross state product per capita (Appendix Table 3). 
To further verify that this is not driving our results, we study the effects of an alternate, 
similarly motivated law as a placebo/falsification test. We use the example of "contingency fee 
limits." These are also enacted by states in response to "aggressive behavior" on the part of 
lawyers. If the endogeneity of such "ambulance-chaser" regulations explains our results then we 
would expect such laws to also be associated with a negative effect on keyword price. If, on the 
other hand we are measuring the effect of the law on ad prices, we would expect such regulation 
15 
 
 
 
to be associated with a positive effect on keyword price. This gives us a way of testing whether 
the endogeneity of the law is driving our results.  
A contingency fee is a fee payable only in the case of a favorable result. Table 4 displays 
the contingency fee limits across states based on data from the Pacific Research Institute’s “U.S. 
Tort Liability Index”. While there is substantial variation in the laws’ texts, all the laws 
ultimately limit how profitable it is to represent a personal injury client.   
Table 4: Contingency Fee Limits 
State Law 
Alaska Requires that contingent fees be calculated exclusive of punitive damages. 
[Alaska Stat. § 9.60.080.] 
Illinois Limits contingent fees to 33.3% of the first $150,000 recovered, 25% of the 
next $850,000 recovered, and 20% of any amount recovered over $1 million. 
[735 Ill. Comp. Stat Ann. § 5/2 –1114.] 
Maine Limits contingent fees in professional liability cases to 33.3% of the first 
$100,000 recovered, 25% of the next $100,000 recovered, and 20% of any 
amount recovered over $2 million. Permits a judge to allow fees in excess of 
these amounts in special circumstances. [Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24 § 2961.] 
Nebraska Allows a court to review contingent fees in medical and professional liability 
cases. [Neb Stat. § 44-2834.] 
Oklahoma Limits contingent fees to 50% of a plaintiff’s recovery. [Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.5, 
§ 7.] 
Wisconsin Limits contingent fees to 1/3 of the first $1 million recovered, 25% of the first 
$1 million recovered if liability is stipulated within 180 days of filing of the 
original complaint and not within 60 days of first day of trial, and 20% for 
amounts exceeding $1 million recovered. Allows a judge to exceed these 
amounts in exceptional circumstances. [Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 655.013.] 
Source: Pacific Research Institute  
 
Table 4 reports the results for an identical specification to Table 3 
 
Table 5: Falsification check using contingency fee limits 
 (1) (2) (3) 
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Personal injury keyword and Law  -2.169** -2.450** -1.962** 
limiting Contingency Fees 
 
(0.837) (0.976) (0.806) 
Observations 12271 5067 12271 
R-squared 0.808 0.762 0.808 
Sample All Accident 
Words and 
Non-Specific 
Words 
Broader Definition of 
Accident Word 
    
All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each city and each keyword. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
State contingency fee limits are associated with a $2.27 decrease in the upper range price 
of personal injury keywords and a $1.86 decrease for the lower range of prices. The robustness 
checks using just limited numbers of keywords and a broader definition of an accident word 
again support the results. In particular, the limited number of keyword results rules out the 
possibility that rules such as Alaska's that encompass all punitive damages are leading to us mis-
specify our control group of words.  This result is again robust to various specifications of the 
error structure. This suggests that when there are no state contingency fee limits to reduce the 
profitability of lawsuits, context-based ad pricing allows search engines to charge higher prices. 
Thus, these context-based ad prices are extremely sensitive to the profitability of the end 
customer.  
 
7. Further Investigation 
We use the effect of state solicitation regulation as a proxy for match difficulty. We further 
stratified our results by other indicators of the difficulty of the matching process. Table 6 shows 
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the results. We only find a positive and significant effect for solicitation regulation when the 
market is "thin." When search volume is estimated as low (less than one search a day), there is a 
negative effect from the solicitation regulation. When the market is thicker (more than one 
search a day), the difficulty of matching off-line produces a negligible effect on prices. Similarly, 
when we break up our results by "lawyer spending," which is an alternate measure of the 
litigiousness of that state or the thickness of the legal market, we find similar results. The 
difficulty of making a match off-line affects prices only when spending on lawyers is low, or in 
our interpretation the population is less litigious making the market thinner.  
Table 6: Further exploration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Personal injury keyword and Law  0.313 0.971** 0.239 1.693*** 
restricting solicitation 
 
(0.459) (0.485) (0.795) (0.631) 
Observations 1753 10518 6148 6123 
R-squared 0.971 0.802 0.801 0.816 
Sample Search 
Volume >=1 
Search 
volume<1 
Above 
median lawyer 
spending/GSP 
Below 
median lawyer 
spending/GSP
+ 
     
All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each city and each keyword. 
+ Resident and active attorneys in 2005 per dollar of gross state product. Source: Pacific Research Institute 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
8. Conclusion 
A new and growing literature asks how search engine pricing reflects match quality. We 
take a different approach, asking how search engine auction pricing reflects match-difficulty.  We 
present initial evidence that suggests that search volume is negatively correlated with prices. This 
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suggests a correlation between difficulties in finding clients and higher search ad prices. 
However, correlation is not necessarily causative. To identify a causal relationship between the 
difficulty of finding clients and search ad-prices, we sought an exogenous shifter of match 
difficulty. We found such a shifter in the form of ambulance-chasing regulations that in several 
states prohibit lawyers from contacting potential clients using written media. When lawyers are 
not allowed to contact a personal injury or wrongful death client by mail, the price of a personal 
injury keyword is $1.01 higher in that state relative to other personal injury keywords controlling 
for location fixed effects. We perform multiple robustness checks for this result, including a 
placebo test to check for the endogeneity of state laws using contingency fee limits. Our findings 
suggest that search engines can monetize the difficulties that vendors have finding clients in thin 
markets. A search engine's ability to use context-based ads to automate without friction the 
match of obscure clients and vendors allows them to profit from the "long tail" of advertising.  
There are both managerial and policy implications to this research. Managerially, our 
results suggest that context-based pricing is an effective marketing strategy for extracting rents 
from advertisers because it enables frictionless matching and lower search costs for vendors 
seeking clients. It is therefore not clear that extending electronic auctions to other advertising 
networks without context-based advertising in place will necessarily reach the "long tail" of 
advertising. For example, it is not clear that Google’s plans to bring online auctions to TV ads 
and conduct these auctions on the basis of “daypart, geography and […] demographic” will be as 
successful as at promoting frictionless matching as its prior online search auctions that are 
conducted using context-based pricing.  
Our findings also have anti-trust implications when it comes to defining markets for 
search engines. They suggest that the existence of off-line markets (in our case direct response 
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advertising) that facilitate matching can reduce a search engine's pricing power. This means that 
anti-trust authorities should look broadly when thinking about the market definition for search 
advertising.  
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Appendix  
Appendix Table 1 
Variable # of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
      
CPC (mid-point) 12271 9.28 7.650 0 52.87 
Personal Injury Keyword 26964 0.187 0.389 0 1 
Law restricting solicitation 26964 0.304 0.460 0 1 
Law restricting contingency fees 26964 0.103 0.303 0 1 
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Appendix Table 2: List of Keywords
 
Personal Injury 
Keywords 
Other Keywords
 
Asbestos Attorney 
Asbestos Lawyer 
Aviation Accident Attorney 
Aviation Accident Lawyer 
Birth Injury Attorney 
Birth Injury Lawyer 
Brain Injury Attorney 
Brain Injury Lawyer 
Car Accident Attorney 
Car Accident Lawyer 
Construction Accident Attorney 
Construction Accident Lawyer 
Dog Bite Attorney 
Dog Bite Lawyer 
Food Poisoning Attorney 
Food Poisoning Lawyer 
Medical Malpractice Attorney 
Medical Malpractice Lawyer 
Mesothelioma Attorney 
Mesothelioma Lawyer 
Personal Injury Attorney 
Personal Injury Lawyer 
Truck Accident Attorney 
Truck Accident Lawyer 
Wrongful Death Attorney 
Wrongful Death Lawyer 
 
 
 
Neutral Keywords 
 
Attorney 
Attorneys 
Law Firm 
Lawsuit 
Lawyer 
Lawyers 
Legal Aid 
Legal Help 
Litigation 
Mediation 
Mediator 
Adoption Attorney 
Adoption Lawyer 
Alimony Attorney 
Alimony Lawyer 
Arson Attorney 
Arson Lawyer 
Assault Attorney 
Assault Lawyer 
Bankruptcy Attorney 
Bankruptcy Lawyer 
Child Abuse Attorney 
Child Abuse Lawyer 
Child Support Attorney 
Child Support Lawyer 
Computer Crime Attorney 
Computer Crime Lawyer 
Contract Attorney 
Contract Lawyer 
Credit Card Fraud Attorney 
Credit Card Fraud Lawyer 
Custody Attorney 
Custody Lawyer 
Divorce Attorney 
Divorce Lawyer 
Domestic Violence Attorney 
Domestic Violence Lawyer 
Drug Possession Attorney 
Drug Possession Lawyer 
Dui Attorney 
Dui Lawyer 
Dwi Attorney 
Dwi Lawyer 
Embezzlement Attorney 
Embezzlement Lawyer 
Employment Attorney 
Employment Lawyer 
Estate Planning Attorney 
Estate Planning Lawyer 
Extortion Attorney 
Extortion Lawyer 
Family Law Attorney 
Family Law Lawyer 
Forgery Attorney 
Forgery Lawyer 
Identity Theft Attorney 
Identity Theft Lawyer 
Immigration Attorney 
Immigration Lawyer 
 
Insurance Fraud 
Attorney 
Insurance Fraud 
Lawyer 
Intellectual Property 
Attorney 
Intellectual Property 
Lawyer 
Landlord Attorney 
Landlord Lawyer 
Living Will Attorney 
Living Will Lawyer 
Mold Attorney 
Mold Lawyer 
Money Laundering 
Attorney 
Money Laundering 
Lawyer 
Nursing Home Abuse 
Attorney 
Nursing Home Abuse 
Lawyer 
Oui Attorney 
Oui Lawyer 
Patent Attorney 
Patent Lawyer 
Perjury Attorney 
Perjury Lawyer 
Premises Liability 
Attorney 
Premises Liability 
Lawyer 
Prenuptial Attorney 
Prenuptial Lawyer 
Probate Attorney 
Probate Lawyer 
Prostitution Attorney 
Prostitution Lawyer 
Real Estate Attorney 
Real Estate Lawyer 
Robbery Attorney 
Robbery Lawyer 
Securities Fraud 
Attorney 
Securities Fraud 
Lawyer 
Sexual Assault 
Attorney 
Sexual Assault Lawyer 
 
Shoplifting 
Attorney 
Shoplifting 
Lawyer 
Tax Attorney 
Tax Lawyer 
Tenant Attorney 
Tenant Lawyer 
Theft Attorney 
Theft Lawyer 
Toxic Mold 
Attorney 
Toxic Mold 
Lawyer 
Traffic Violation 
Attorney 
Traffic Violation 
Lawyer 
Visa Attorney 
Visa Lawyer 
Workers 
Compensation 
Attorney 
Workers 
Compensation 
Lawyer 
Wrongful 
Termination 
Attorney 
Wrongful 
Termination 
Lawyer 
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Appendix Table 3: Correlation Coefficients for State Laws and State Characteristics  
 
 
Gross 
state 
product 
per 
capita 
State 
population  
Average 
CPC 
upper 
bound 
Average 
CPC 
lower 
bound 
Presence of 
solicitation 
regulation 
Presence of 
contingency 
fee limit 
Resident 
and 
active 
attorneys 
per dollar 
of state 
GSP 
Total state 
trial-
courts' 
incoming 
civil cases 
per 1000 
population 
         GSP per capita 1.00 
       
        State population  -0.05 1.00 
       (0.70) 
       Average CPC upper bound -0.12 -0.11 1.00 
     (0.42) (0.46) 
      Average CPC lower bound 0.34*** 0.30** 0.16 1.00 
    (0.01) (0.03) (0.27) 
     Solicitation regulation -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.15 1.00 
   (0.65) (0.81) (0.63) (0.29) 
    Contingency fee limit 0.34*** -0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.26* 1.00 
  (0.02) (0.37) (0.25) (0.74) (0.07) 
   Resident and active attorneys 0.03 0.27* -0.17 -0.09 0.03 0.07 1.00 
 (0.84) (0.06) (0.23) (0.53) (0.84) (0.63) 
  Civil cases 0.25* 0.03 -0.09 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.01 1.00 
(0.09) (0.84) (0.56) (0.49) (0.99) (0.27) (0.95) 
  
